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ABSTRACT
For most major economies, state-backed export credit is a core element of
industrial policy and their strategies to boost exports and economic growth.
Surprisingly, however, at a time when its competitors are increasing their
use of this policy tool, state-backed export credit has become the subject of a
hotly contested political battle in the US. As a result of opposition from the
Tea Party, the US Export–Import Bank was forced to halt its lending
operations for five months in 2015 and subsequently limited to financing
only the smallest transactions. In this article, I show that the disruption of
export credit is undermining the competitiveness of key US industrial
sectors and encouraging the movement of advanced, high-value-added
manufacturing overseas. The case of export credit therefore presents an
important puzzle: Why is the US moving in the opposite direction of other
states and taking steps that undermine its economic interests? I argue that
the internal US attack on export credit is fueled by the prevailing market
fundamentalist ideology that has obscured the role of an active state in
fostering the US’s economic success. This article demonstrates how the rise
of a powerful anti-state movement is hindering the ability of the US to
conduct effective industrial policy and maintain its economic primacy in the
face of growing global competitive pressures.
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INTRODUCTION
The rise of new powers, such as China and India, and the implications for
US hegemony have become a central preoccupation of international rela-
tions scholars and policy-makers alike. Far from new, discussions of the
decline of US hegemony have been occurring for decades. As Fred Block
and Matthew Keller (2014: 20) argue, although declinists have
‘consistently underestimated the political, economic and military resil-
ience of the US’, rendering their predictions of the demise of US hege-
mony premature, this does not mean that American hegemony can or
will go on indefinitely. It is therefore worthwhile to examine sources of
strength and resilience as well as sources of decay or stagnation. This
article contributes to our understanding of contemporary challenges to
US hegemony by focusing on export credit – an important but under-
studied area of economic policy-making that has recently emerged as a
major subject of political contestation within the US and of competition
among states internationally.
The global political economy of official export credit – the use of loans
and other forms of financing by states to boost exports – is being dramati-
cally transformed. As one of the primary tools used by states to enhance
the competitiveness of their exports, export credit has taken on renewed
strategic importance in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, with
states focused on expanding exports as a means to bolster economic
growth and employment. While states around the world have been
increasing their use of export credit, there has been an explosion in the
use of export credit by the ‘BRICs’ (Brazil, Russia, India and China), erod-
ing the efficacy of existing international rules intended to prevent a com-
petitive spiral of state subsidization via export credit.
Amid this trend, the US is a striking outlier, moving in the opposite
direction of eliminating or severely circumscribing its use of state-backed
export credit. Once an obscure bureaucratic agency, virtually unknown
to the general public, the US Export–Import Bank (Exim) recently burst
onto the public stage, becoming a highly contentious focus of national
political debate. The Tea Party made the Bank a prime target of its cam-
paign to dramatically reduce the size of government and its role in the
economy. As a result, Exim was forced to cease all operations for five
months in 2015 and subsequently the vast majority of its lending activity
(approximately 85%) has been blocked. The future of the Bank remains in
doubt, as the Tea Party continues to aggressively press for its elimination.
In this article, I draw on the case of the battle over the Export–Import
Bank to argue that the US’s ability to respond to growing competitive
challenges is being hampered by a powerful domestic anti-state move-
ment. As I will show, by unilaterally constraining its use of export credit,
the US is relinquishing an important industrial policy tool. The
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disruption of export credit is undermining the ability of US firms and
industries to compete in critical sectors and encouraging the offshoring
of advanced, high-value-added manufacturing and related activities.
How then do we explain the Tea Party’s attack on the Bank? I argue that
the campaign against Exim has been rooted in and fueled by the spread
of an ultra-free-market discourse predicated on the denial and erasure of
the role of an active state and industrial policy in creating the US’s eco-
nomic success, which is compounded by an overestimation of the US’s
current power in the global political economy and a failure to recognize
the degree to which its economic and political dominance is being under-
mined by emerging challengers. Drawing on the case of export credit, I
argue that the grip of market fundamentalist ideology, combined with
the prevalence of inaccurate ideas about how the US achieved its global
economic dominance and has maintained it to date, are weakening the
US’s ability to maintain its economic primacy in the face of rising
challengers.
The Tea Party campaign against the Exim Bank generated substantial
opposition from American business, including its largest and most pow-
erful corporations and industry associations. Remarkably, however, big
business – traditionally one of the most influential actors in US politics
and having waged its own massive counter-mobilization effort to defend
the Bank – found its power significantly undercut by the ultra-free-mar-
ket ideology of the Tea Party. Contemporary struggles over export credit
thus reveal an important irony: while American business actors were
originally among the key proponents responsible for the ascendance and
spread of neoliberalism in the US and globally, market fundamentalism
is now being turned against business and undermining its economic
interests.1
NEOLIBERALISM, INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND AMERICAN
HEGEMONY
The US has been a major driver of the rise and global spread of neoliber-
alism as an ideology and policy paradigm, directed at reducing the role
of the state in the economy by liberalizing trade and capital flows, priva-
tizing state-owned enterprises, lowering taxes and public spending, and
freeing business from government regulation. More than merely an ide-
ology, the Washington Consensus was a strategy aimed at renewing and
re-establishing US power after its relative decline in the 1970s (Chorev
and Babb 2009). The US pressed other countries to open their markets to
its exports, investment and multinationals, while nonetheless maintain-
ing many of its own protectionist policies (Porter 2005). While using its
power in global economic governance to curtail the scope for developing
countries to engage in industrial policy, the US left itself considerable
3
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room to maneuver, developing more complex and sophisticated forms of
industrial support targeting high-value sectors and designed to secure its
leading position in advanced industries (Weiss 2005). As a prescription
for development, neoliberalism proved highly flawed, resulting in dein-
dustrialization and economic stagnation in many developing countries
(Bayliss, Fine and van Waeyenberge 2011). Consequently, even within
the multilateral institutions that were once its leading champions, such
as the IMF and World Bank, there is now growing recognition that neo-
liberalism was an ineffective strategy for generating durable economic
growth (Ostry, Loungani and Furceri 2016).
Instead, the international economic institutions are increasingly signal-
ing a rejection of market fundamentalism and renewed appreciation of
the importance of industrial policy (Lazonick 2008; Robinson 2011;
Rodrik 2008; Stiglitz, Esteban and Yifu 2013). This shift has been driven
by recognition that an active state engaged in industrial policy was criti-
cal to the remarkable rise of China and other emerging economies (Ban
and Blyth 2013). The global financial crisis also destabilized the neoliberal
orthodoxy and brought disillusionment with the promise of unfettered
markets, and since the crisis, many states have placed increasing empha-
sis on industrial policy as a means to boost economic growth and
employment. The debate among economists and policy-makers is thus
no longer whether industrial policy is desirable but what form it should
take (Lin and Chang 2009).
For many advanced-industrialized states, the resurgence of interest in
industrial policy – policies designed to promote the competitiveness of a
country’s firms and industries (Beath 2002) – has come from concerns
about their declining share of global manufacturing amid growing com-
petition from emerging economies. While the share of manufacturing in
GDP and employment in developed countries has been falling,
manufacturing still occupies a central position in these economies; collec-
tively, they continue to account for the bulk of manufacturing value
added, although China and other new competitors have grown consider-
ably in importance over the past two decades (Figure 1). There are also
interdependencies between manufacturing and other sectors in high-
income economies – with backward and forward linkages to R&D, prod-
uct design and engineering – such that the distinction between
manufacturing and services is increasingly blurred. Although the US and
other advanced economies maintain a lead in higher-value-added,
medium-high and high-tech manufacturing, these are areas where China
and other emerging economies are rapidly gaining ground (OECD 2013).
As one OECD report states, ‘competition from emerging economies is
growing, even in activities and markets that were, until recently, consid-
ered the core strengths of OECD countries’ (Warwick 2013: 7). Among
high-income countries, there are therefore concerns that the loss of core
4
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manufacturing activities may erode adjacent activities in the value chain,
leaving these countries struggling to retain high value activities such as
innovation, R&D and design (Block and Keller 2014; Pisano and Shih
2012; Warwick 2013).
In a turn away from the neoliberal orthodoxy that has dominated eco-
nomic thinking since the 1980s, many states are increasingly seeking to
use the policy tools at their disposal to actively intervene in markets to
promote the competitiveness of their firms and industries and thereby
boost exports, employment and growth. Yet amid what has been
described as a ‘renaissance of industrial policy’ (Warwick 2013), the US is
hamstringing itself by constraining the use of an important industrial
policy tool – export credit. By restricting its own use of export credit, the
US is hampering the ability of its firms and industries to compete in key
sectors. In the name of free markets, the US is tying its own hands –
restraining the scope for the state to intervene in markets to promote US
economic interests – not because it is being compelled to by external
forces, but because of constraints being imposed by a powerful internal
domestic political movement in the thrall of market fundamentalist
ideology.
Moreover, this is occurring in the context of an increasingly multipolar
world, where the rise of new powers is challenging both American eco-
nomic and political dominance (Bremmer and Roubini 2011; Hopewell
2016; Patrick 2010). There are major questions about whether – and how –
the US will retain its hegemonic position in the international system in
the context of the growing power of China and other emerging chal-
lengers (Babones 2015; Norrlof 2010). A growing body of scholarship has
argued that the US’s own domestic policies and management have signif-
icant consequences for its ability to maintain its hegemony (Haass 2014;
Figure 1. Share of global manufacturing.
Source: OECD.
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Kupchan 2012; Nye 2010). This article contributes to this debate by exam-
ining the case of export credit – a little analyzed but crucial area of eco-
nomic policy – where, I will show, the US is taking steps that undermine
its economic might.
As the following analysis will demonstrate, the Tea Party’s effort to
severely restrict or eliminate US export credit undermines the country’s
competitiveness as a site for advanced manufacturing and related indus-
tries. A key question then is why the Tea Party is pursuing an agenda
that is against US economic and strategic interests. I argue that two key
misperceptions have helped give rise to and fueled the campaign against
the Export–Import Bank: an inaccurate conception of the role of the state
in the US’s industrial development and a false understanding of the sour-
ces and extent of US power in the international system.
The Tea Party’s campaign against Exim is rooted in a failure to recog-
nize and appreciate the role of an active state and industrial policy in
building US economic supremacy – and, by extension, its political domi-
nance. Despite trumpeting the virtues of unfettered markets, the US has
always made use of industrial policy and, indeed, this has been critical to
its economic success (Block and Keller 2011; Lazonick 2008; Schrank and
Whitford 2009; Weiss 2014). Thus, as Block and Keller (2014: 20) argue,
‘prevailing accounts of the US as a liberal market economy are deeply
misleading’. The US – like all other successful developers – has exempli-
fied the vital role of the state in supporting industrial development
(Chang 2002; OECD 2013; Warwick 2013). Yet this reality is systemati-
cally erased by the prevailing ideology that obscures the true underpin-
nings of US economic power. Within American popular discourse, there
is a collective ‘amnesia’ about the contribution of government to
America’s economic success as a result of a deliberate campaign to dele-
gitimize the role of an active state (Hacker and Pierson 2016). In the
words of Fred Block (2011: 4), proponents of market fundamentalism cre-
ated ‘a fictive American past in which the substantial economic role
played by government – from the founding – was made to disappear’.
Unlike many states, which are more open and explicit about their devel-
opmental agendas, the US developmental state has been largely hidden
and invisible to mainstream public debate (Block 2008).
This is also tied to a fictitious idea of how America obtained its global
economic and political dominance, shaped by what Jeff Faux (2012) calls
the US’s ‘national delusion of exceptionalism’ – faith in America’s natu-
ral, inherent superiority and the belief that, in a fair game with a level
playing field, the US will inevitably prevail. This view is widely found
throughout American political discourse. According to President Obama
in his 2012 State of the Union Address, for example, ‘Our workers are the
most productive on Earth, and if the playing field is level, I promise you:
America will always win’. This stance cuts across the political spectrum,
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with Obama’s statement echoing those of earlier presidents, such as
George W. Bush, who similarly proclaimed in his 2006 State of the Union,
‘With open markets and a level playing field, no one can outproduce or
outcompete the American worker’ (Faux 2012). The assumption that the
US will always triumph in a world of free markets belies the fact that the
US gained its economic supremacy not through free markets and open
competition but through an interventionist state actively engaged in fos-
tering its economic development, and the US consolidated its dominant
position not through a level playing field but by using its hegemonic
position to tilt the rules of the multilateral trading system in its favor
(Wilkinson 2011).
The Tea Party’s efforts to eliminate US export credit – a product of its
broader antipathy towards the state – rest on a lack of recognition that
without continued intervention by the state to bolster growth and com-
petitiveness, the US position in the global economy will be weakened.
The Tea Party attack on Exim is also shaped by an overestimation of the
US’s current power in international affairs, manifest in the assumption
that either other countries will follow its example by restricting their own
use of export credit, or that the US will be able to force them to do so.
This can be seen as a form of hegemonic hubris – an excessive confidence
in the US’s ability to dominate the global economy and its governance,
and a failure to recognize the extent to which it is being diminished by
contemporary power shifts.
THE BATTLE OVER THE US EXPORT–IMPORT BANK
Export credit is an important case to examine because it represents an
instance of US industrial policy – the US’s ‘hidden’ developmental state
(Block 2008) – being brought from the shadows into the open and made
the subject of intense public debate. In this section, following a brief dis-
cussion of the changing global political economy of export credit, I turn
to examine the origins and impact of the Tea Party’s campaign against
the US Export–Import Bank. I make the case that the Tea Party’s opposi-
tion to Exim is rooted in a misguided faith in free markets and the contin-
ued inevitability of US power. The Tea Party’s effort to dismantle the
Bank – and ultimately other elements of US industrial policy – threatens
to undermine US competitiveness in the face of rising challengers. As I
show, these effects are already being felt, with the disruption of export
credit precipitating a movement of advanced manufacturing overseas.
Regardless of the specific fate of the Tea Party, these kinds of ideological
and political forces have deep roots and widespread popular support
and are therefore expected to remain prominent and continue to shape
US politics for some time (Skocpol and Williamson 2012).
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The global political economy of export credit
Trade finance is a critical aspect of the global economy: approximately 80%–
90% of world trade relies on some form of financing (Akhtar 2015). While
most trade financing comes from the private sector, states also play a vital
role. Every major economy has an export credit agency (ECA) that provides
various forms of financing to facilitate and expand exports, including direct
loans to foreign buyers, insurance and loan guarantees, working capital
financing, and finance for large-scale infrastructure and industrial projects.
Official export credit occupies a crucial niche, filling gaps in, or helping to
bolster, the availability of private financing. ECAs are heavily involved, for
example, in long-term export financing, including financing for complex,
multi-billion dollar sales such as aircraft and infrastructure projects. In such
sectors, ECA support can help make transactions more commercially attrac-
tive by mitigating risks of financing or by providing another source of fund-
ing to diversify risks. As Andrew Moravcsik (1989: 176) states, export credit
is ‘the financial lubricant that keeps the international trade system going’.
Approximately 60 ECAs are in operation globally, providing $300 billion in
trade-related finance annually (Akhtar 2015).
For many countries, state provision of export credit is a core part of
their industrial policy and national export strategies. The importance of
export credit has only been amplified since the global financial crisis.
During the crisis, when the availability of commercial credit contracted
dramatically, government-backed export credit played a critical role in
filling the gap in trade finance and keeping international trade moving,
preventing the financial crisis from spiraling into a worldwide depres-
sion (Auboin 2015). The ensuing implementation of new Basel III finan-
cial regulations diminished the availability of private lending for certain
forms of trade, increasing the need for state-backed export credit (Akhtar
2015). Even the World Bank and the WTO – long-standing champions of
free market economics – recognize state-backed export credit as an
important industrial policy and development tool, as well as a means to
address market failure and a vital source of counter-cyclical lending
(World Bank 1993). As one WTO official summarized, ‘It simply makes
sense for ECAs to play a role in financing trade’.2
The US Export–Import Bank was created as part of the New Deal in
1934. In FY2014, Exim authorized over 3700 transactions totaling $20.5
billion, which supported $27.5 billion worth of exports and 164,000 jobs.3
It is a small government agency, with less than 400 staff, that regularly
generates revenue; in 2014, for example, Exim contributed $675 million
to the US Treasury. To provide an illustration of how it operates: Exim
supports the American aerospace sector by supplying financing to facili-
tate the sale of Boeing jets to foreign buyers. Given the size of these trans-
actions (a large aircraft can cost $250–500 million), the purchasing
8
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airlines usually require loans to make the purchase possible. Exim can
step in to provide direct loans when commercial financing is unavailable,
or to guarantee (and thereby reduce the cost of) commercial loans. Aero-
space is just one example of the industries supported by Exim and its
counterparts around the world.
The global landscape of export credit has changed profoundly with the
rise of the BRICs. Since 2000, export credit provision by the BRICs has
surged from less than 3% to 40% of the world total.4 The vast majority has
come from China, which constitutes 90% of the export credit activity of the
BRIC countries and is now the world’s largest export credit provider. In
2014, China supplied $58 billion in medium and long-term export credit
support – far more than the $12 billion provided by the US and, indeed,
more than all the G7 rich countries combined – and an additional $43 billion
in overseas investment financing to promote its exports (Figure 2).5
China is aggressively using export credit to foster industrial upgrading
and the global expansion of its firms. Export credit has been the driving
force, for example, behind the much-reported expansion of China’s activities
in Africa, Latin America and elsewhere; while often mistakenly described as
aid, most of China’s foreign lending is in fact export credit – loans tied to the
export of Chinese goods (Br€autigam 2009). Export credit is a central part of
China’s strategy to escape the ‘middle-income trap’ by transitioning from
exporting consumer to capital goods. Although smaller in scale, the other
emerging economies are using export financing strategically in key sectors
to significant effect (such as Brazil in construction, Russia in nuclear energy,
Figure 2. Newmedium- and long-term official export credit volumes, 2014.
Source: Exim Competitiveness Report, 2015.
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and India in transportation and energy). The dramatic expansion in the use
of official export credit by China and the other BRICs poses a serious com-
petitive challenge to the US and other traditional powers.
The rise of the Tea Party
The Tea Party has emerged as a potent force in US politics, transforming
the American political landscape. It is made up of a combination of forces –
grassroots activists, advocacy organizations backed by ideologically moti-
vated wealthy donors, and influential right-wing media outlets. The Tea
Party burst onto the scene in early 2009, prompted by the election of Presi-
dent Obama and Democratic majorities in the House and Senate (Ashbee
2011; Maxwell and Parent 2012). The movement was propelled by fears on
the right that Obama and the Democrats would reshape US policies, by
tightening regulations, raising taxes, and expanding social programs, as
well as anger at the bank bailouts and stimulus package triggered by the
financial crisis (Skocpol and Williamson 2012; Van Dyke and Meyer 2016).
The emergence of the Tea Party was thus, in part, a response to the more
assertive and visible use of industrial policy by the US (Schrank and Whit-
ford 2009). It is estimated that close to a quarter of the US population sup-
ports the movement or evaluates it positively (Barreto et al. 2011).
Among the leading funders of the Tea Party are billionaires David and
Charles Koch – tied as the fifth wealthiest individuals in the US – who
have been highly active in financing ultra-free-market political cam-
paigns (Mayer 2016). The Koch brothers organized a network of wealthy
conservative donors, channeling hundreds of millions of dollars to an
integrated set of libertarian, anti-government political organizations. As
Theda Skocpol and Alexander Hertel-Fernandez document (Skocpol
2016; Skocpol and Hertel-Fernandez 2016), the Koch network has worked
to penetrate and capture the Republican Party and pull its agenda to the
right on political-economic issues. Americans for Prosperity, the hub of
the Koch network, is now thoroughly intertwined with the Republican
Party. For candidates seeking support from the Koch network – whose
vast financial and staff resources now exceed those of the Republican
Party itself – the price is accepting its ultra-free-market policy agenda.
The Koch network monitors the activities of Republicans in Congress to
ensure that their legislative agendas and votes match its preferred posi-
tions. Those who are not sufficiently aligned with its agenda risk being
unseated in primary campaigns, as the Koch network backs challengers
espousing more extreme free market views. The Koch network has thus
played a major role in the extraordinary rise and political influence of the
Tea Party and driving Republican candidates and officeholders toward
increasingly extreme economic positions.
10
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The Kochs obtained their fortunes from Koch Industries, a large indus-
trial conglomerate with substantial oil and gas operations, and most of
the other network participants similarly derived their wealth from busi-
nesses. There are some complementarities between the business interests
of network participants and the agenda it seeks to advance, such as
reducing taxes, loosening government regulations, undermining labor
unions, and opposing environmental regulations (including funding cli-
mate change denial). Yet, drawing on an extensive study of the Koch net-
work, Hertel-Fernandez and Skocpol (2016) argue against a reductionist
interpretation that equates its political objectives solely with the interests
of Koch Industries or the company ties of other wealthy donors in the
network. Propelled by a deep antipathy towards the state, their political
advocacy goes beyond ‘mere corporate self-interest’, pursuing many
causes far beyond the narrow scope of their business interests – and even
some that contradict those business interests, such as opposing tax cuts
and subsidies for the private sector. While the interests of mainstream
business and the Koch network align on certain issues, ‘the Koch network
promotes a much more sweeping, ideologically inspired free-market
agenda’ (Hertel-Fernandez and Skocpol 2016).
The Tea Party campaign against Exim
The Tea Party campaign against the Exim Bank began in 2010, when
Republicans won control of Congress. Organizations advocating a free
market agenda – including Americans for Prosperity, Club for Growth,
Heritage Action, Cato Foundation, Mercatus Center, and American
Enterprise Institute, many of which were created and/or backed by the
Koch network – began mobilizing opposition to Exim and made abolish-
ing the Bank one of their key political goals. This was a top-down initia-
tive, orchestrated by Koch-funded groups, rather than arising from the
grassroots; indeed, most Tea Party members had never even heard of
Exim before. As one organization representative described: ‘We launched
a major grassroots education campaign. When we first started, people
didn’t even know what Exim was. They had no idea what we were talk-
ing about. Folks would say: “Huh? What’s wrong with FM radio?”’6
Through this grassroots mobilization led by influential pro-market
groups, ‘Exim became the cause celebre’ of the Tea Party as the movement
gained prominence in Washington.7
Although the Bank has periodically been subject to criticism from free
market conservatives – most recently during the Reagan administration
(Baron 1983) – in the past any such opposition had been overcome by the
Bank’s powerful supporters in industry and Congress and never substan-
tially disrupted its functioning (Becker and McClenahan 2003).8 This
11
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changed with the rise of the Tea Party. Exim is authorized by ‘sunset’ leg-
islation that requires regular Congressional reauthorization; unless legis-
lation to renew its charter is approved by Congress, the institution
expires. For nearly 80 years, Congress routinely reauthorized the Bank’s
charter, usually with little or no controversy. However, the Tea Party
began mobilizing opposition towards Exim in advance of its 2012 reau-
thorization. Although the Bank was reauthorized by Congress, the Tea
Party succeeded in limiting its authorization to two years, rather than the
normal five – ensuring that the fight over the Bank’s existence continued
without pause, while the Tea Party campaign against it gained momen-
tum and grew in strength. Subsequently, when the Bank’s authorization
expired on 30 June 2015, the Tea Party used its sway in Congress to block
reauthorization.
The Tea Party objects to Exim as a deviation from free markets, arguing
that it represents ‘crony capitalism’ and ‘corporate welfare’. The Bank’s
opponents contend that government support for business and exports is
‘unnecessary’ and ‘inefficient’ (Mercatus 2014), and as Senator Marco
Rubio puts it, ‘the government shouldn’t be picking winners and losers’
(Everett and Raju 2015). According to Representative Jeb Hensarling,
Chair of the House Financial Services Committee, which has jurisdiction
over the Bank, and one of its most powerful opponents in Congress:
The best way to level the playing field for American exporters and
manufacturers is not with taxpayer subsidies, guarantees and politi-
cally driven lending, but instead with more opportunity… A pro-
growth agenda — including fundamental tax reform, American
energy independence, cutting burdensome red tape and reducing
abusive lawsuits — will do more to help our exporters, manufac-
turers and small businesses than the Export-Import Bank ever
could.9
Critics complain that the Bank interferes with the market and forces US
taxpayers to assume the risks of foreign loans that should be the respon-
sibility of the private sector. They further protest that Exim uses Ameri-
can taxpayers’ money, in the words of Representative Hensarling, ‘to
help foreign corporations, including businesses that are owned by the
governments of China, Russia, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates’. The Tea Party contends that American economic success is
rooted in free markets: as one representative stated, ‘I don’t think we’ve
ever benefited in any market by taking a protectionist stance. We protect
our markets by building better products’.10 And, in the absence of Exim,
the Tea Party maintains that ‘the free market will step in’.11 Those seek-
ing to eliminate the Bank express confidence in the competitiveness of
US industry: to quote Republican Study Committee Chair Bill Flores, ‘we
12
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know American businesses are capable of competing in a free and open
market, without government interfering’ (Cirilli 2015).
The campaign against Exim is not just about the Bank itself, but about
legitimating the Tea Party’s broader campaign to restrict the role of gov-
ernment. In the words of Senator Ted Cruz:
If we’re to have credibility on reforming government across the
board, if we are to have credibility on reforming welfare, to get off of
dependency and get back on our own feet, we need to demonstrate
as a first step that we can wean giant corporations of that same
dependency of the federal government. (Everett and Raju 2015)
Exim was chosen strategically to show that the Tea Party is going after all
forms of welfare, not just those targeting the poor and middle class. As a
representative of Heritage Action stated, ‘If you’re going to be successful
in reforming entitlements, you don’t have moral credibility if you don’t
take on corporate welfare – and you can’t do better than Exim’ (Mascaro
2015). The campaign against Exim is explicitly intended to build a new
‘free market populism’ on the right (Carney 2011).
The Tea Party’s credibility as a popular, grassroots movement had
been tarnished by its financing by the billionaire Koch brothers. Target-
ing Exim, however, enabled the Tea Party to deflect such criticism by pre-
senting itself as leading the charge against ‘big business’. Similarly, for
Republicans, according to Representative Hensarling, ‘this is an impor-
tant fight for our party to have’ because ‘we have been tagged as the
party to some extent of big business’ (Bair 2015). Going after public subsi-
dies to big business resonated strongly in the aftermath of the financial
crisis, with the Tea Party’s campaign against Exim feeding off public out-
rage at the bailouts of Wall Street banks and the auto industry. The Exim
campaign generated flattering headlines for the Tea Party and its sup-
porters in Congress (such as ‘Smackdown: Conservatives vs. Big Busi-
ness’ in Newsweek and ‘Jeb Hensarling Takes a Swing at Corporate
Welfare’ in Fortune), while enabling the Tea Party to turn the tables and
paint its opponents (whether Democrats or moderate Republicans) as the
handmaidens of big business.
The Tea Party mobilized its considerable political machinery in opposi-
tion to Exim, including: organizing educational and political action cam-
paigns directed at their grassroots supporters (which in the case of
Americans for Prosperity alone consists of 2.8 million members); holding
town hall meetings across the country; using their considerable financial
resources for large-scale advertising campaigns, including hostile TV ads
against Republicans who had not come out in opposition to the Bank; dis-
seminating ‘report cards’ evaluating Republican candidates on where
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they stood on Exim; lobbying members of Congress and their staff in
their districts; and directing lobbying on Capitol Hill.12 As a representa-
tive of Americans for Prosperity described: ‘This little never-heard-of
bank, it became kind of a litmus test for people who wanted to prove
their potential free-market bona fides’ (Mascaro 2015). The reach and
influence of the Tea Party put immense pressure on Republican members
of Congress and Presidential candidates to oppose Exim reauthorization.
Billionaires versus big business
Exim has extensive support from the business community. In response to
the Tea Party, business actors – including apex industry associations
(such as the US Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of
Manufacturers (NAM)), sectoral industry associations (e.g. Aerospace,
Nuclear, Wind Energy), major corporations, and small and medium-
sized businesses (including the National Small Business Association and
the Small Business Exporters Association) – united in a massive cam-
paign to defend the Bank. As one representative bluntly stated: ‘We’ve
had to wage a full-scale frontal assault’.13 Given that the Tea Party cam-
paign against Exim has been primarily bankrolled by the Koch brothers
and other wealthy donors, one representative of US industry captured
the unusual nature of the resulting faceoff as ‘billionaires versus big busi-
ness’.14 The Bank’s supporters argue that it plays a vital role in facilitat-
ing US exports and supporting US jobs. They point out that the risk to
taxpayers is minimal – the Bank has a default rate of well below 1%,
lower than most commercial banks, and a high recovery rate. Since Exim
charges interest and fees, it generates revenue for the American govern-
ment, sending $6.9 billion in profits to the Treasury over the last two dec-
ades. Its supporters argue that eliminating Exim will put US firms and
industries at a competitive disadvantage and cause US corporations to
lose global market share. In short, to quote the US’s former lead trade
negotiator, Ron Kirk: ‘You have all of these interests saying, “Wait, a min-
ute, this is critically important to us”’ (Mascaro 2015).
In fact, for many years business actors have been seeking to expand the
resources and scope of the Bank to enable the US to better keep pace with
its competitors. According to a representative of US industry, ‘we’d like
the Bank to be put on steroids’.15 Relative to the magnitude of US
exports, Exim’s funding authority has sharply declined over the past
40 years, and the US has fallen behind other states in the provision
of export credit (Hufbauer, Fickling and Wong 2011). South Korea,
for example, now provides more than twice as much support to its
exporters, even though the US economy is 10 times larger and
exports 3 times more.16 In addition, the export credit provided by
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other states is generally more flexible, less restrictive, and less cum-
bersome and difficult to access, making US financing less competitive.
Consequently, prior to the explosion of controversy surrounding
reauthorization, many actors – including the Obama Administration
and some members of Congress – had called for increasing the
Bank’s lending ceiling, making its lending policies less restrictive,
and expanding coverage to encompass a broader range of exports
such as services (Bergsten 2014; Hufbauer, Fickling and Wong 2011).
Ultimately, however, the objective of reforming US export credit to
‘fight fire with fire’ (Bergsten 2014) was eclipsed by the struggle to
simply keep the Bank alive in the face of the Tea Party challenge.
For many American policy-makers, officials and business actors, the
controversy surrounding Exim came as a shock. According to former US
Trade Representative Kirk: ‘It caught a lot of people off guard.… I don’t
think anyone believed it would grow to this extreme’ (Mascaro 2015).
America’s corporate leaders express bewilderment at the storm of oppo-
sition to Exim’s reauthorization and the extreme difficulties they have
faced attempting to secure the continued functioning of the Bank. As one
business representative explained:
The Tea Party has got a whole army working on this. They put out
so much misinformation – they pump out this stuff like it’s coming
out of a firehose. We can’t keep up with this – the whole coalition
[of business actors supporting Exim] can’t keep up with this. People
say ‘corporations rule America’ but look at this. This has been a
massive effort: every Fortune 100 company is around the table at
NAM or the US Chamber; we’ve had daily conference calls for a
year on this; all kinds of consulting firms on hire, working full time
on this; we’ve had fly-ins bringing hundreds of people in to lobby
on Capitol Hill. This whole situation is ‘through the looking-glass’!
You have all of corporate America and all of the Democrats and a
sizeable number of Republicans and the White House – and we still
can’t get it done. Who would dream we couldn’t get it with all this
backing?17
Another echoed this sentiment: ‘We’re just left saying to ourselves: “what
the hell is going on here?” We’ve been crying our heads off, but we’ve
been almost completely hamstrung politically’.18 Remarkably, business
found its economic interests being overridden by the ultra-free-market
ideology of the Tea Party. This was all the more surprising because, as
one industry lobbyist stated, ‘We’re usually the darlings of conservatives
and most Republicans – we get fierce championing and support from
Republicans’.19 But even Republicans who have traditionally been allies
15
HOPEWELL: MARKET FUNDAMENTALISM VS. INDUSTRIAL POLICY
of business and privately support Exim are hesitant to champion it publi-
cally, fearing the political heat from the Tea Party. In the current political
climate, a business representative explained, ‘No one on Capitol Hill
wants to hear from large companies anymore – to represent large compa-
nies on Capitol Hill is to put a target on your back’.20
The disruption of US export credit
The Exim fight created a deep split among Republicans. Although the
majority of Republicans in Congress continued to support the Bank, the
Tea Party campaign against Exim gained the support of most congressio-
nal Republican leaders, as well as the majority of Republicans on the piv-
otal House Financial Services Committee, which has responsibility for
reauthorization of the Bank in the lower chamber. Exim also became a
focal issue in the presidential primaries. As a result of pressure from the
Tea Party, virtually every Republican presidential candidate campaigned
against the Bank – with candidates devoting entire speeches to this once
obscure agency. With its significant political clout, the Tea Party suc-
ceeded in preventing reauthorization of the Bank’s statutory charter,
forcing it to shutdown and cease issuing new loans as of July 2015.
Approximately 200 transactions worth more than $9 billion were stopped
in the pipeline. With the House Financial Services Committee blocking a
vote on the floor of the House, the Bank remained shutdown for five
months. Only in December, through a rare procedural maneuver, were
its advocates able to get a bill to the floor, where it passed, providing a
four year reauthorization for the Bank (to 2019).
Even though Exim has now been reauthorized, the Tea Party has vowed
to continue fighting the Bank, using its influence in Congress to tie Exim up
in continual battles for its reauthorization and restrict its authority to such
an extent that it can effectively no longer function. As one industry repre-
sentative summed up, ‘they will continue to do everything they can to gut
the Bank’.21 Although the Bank reopened in December 2015, its operations
remain sharply constrained a year later. All transactions over $10 million
require the approval of its Board of Directors; however, with three seats
empty on its five-member Board, it lacks the necessary quorum. Board
members are nominated by the US president and must be confirmed by the
Senate Banking Committee. The Committee Chair, Richard Shelby, an
Exim opponent, blocked any nominations to its Board by refusing to hold
confirmation hearings. Until a new member of the board is confirmed by
the Senate, Exim can only approve small export deals, not large orders for
goods like aircraft, satellites, and major manufacturing equipment. This has
a significant impact on the workings of the Bank, since large deals consti-
tute 80%–90% of its loans. It leaves major exporters like Boeing, General
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Electric and Caterpillar without access to official export credit in the US.
The Tea Party and its allies have thus used inaction on nominations as a
way to dramatically limit the operations of the Bank.
In reauthorizing the Bank, Congress made concessions to its critics,
including reducing Exim’s overall lending cap to $135 billion from $140 bil-
lion and increasing the percentage dedicated to small businesses to 25%
from 20%. Such rules further restrict the Bank’s scope of operations, at a
time when many other countries’ ECAs are already far less restrictive. For
example, while Exim’s rules dictate that it cannot finance a percentage of a
loan greater than the total percentage of US content in any given product,
other ECAs, such as in Japan and Europe, are not similarly limited. Can-
ada’s ECA can provide financing for any transaction regardless of the per-
centage of domestic content, provided it is in Canada’s national interest.
Furthermore, many of these other ECAs are actively working to make their
provision of export credit more flexible and therefore easier to access and
more competitive.
The Tea Party is highly satisfied with the results of its campaign
against the Bank: as one representative stated, ‘This is the most successful
campaign we’ve ever had’.22 The Tea Party and its allies in Congress
have vowed that the battle over Exim will continue. According to one
Tea Party leader,
Now we have a bank that’s been wounded, and we plan on fighting
Exim until it’s done. I don’t think you’ll ever see us stop. Exim is an
emblem of what we’re about. So you’re going to be hearing about Exim
for a long time. It can’t crawl back into the shadows, that’s for sure.23
Many expect the Bank may not survive when its new charter expires in
2019, or that due to continued efforts to limit its scope and operations, it
may become too encumbered to function effectively. This prolonged uncer-
tainty about the ability of US exporters to provide ECA-backed financing is
itself highly damaging – it creates a disincentive to invest in US production
facilities and, especially for long-term projects and investments, as one
industry representative stated, it ‘could be fatal to US competitiveness’.24
For over five years, the battle over the future of Exim has consumed an
enormous amount of time, energy and resources – of the Bank’s staff,
American policy-makers and political leaders, and the country’s major
business actors – and the conflict shows no signs of abating.
Why Exim?
A natural question is why the Tea Party decided to target Exim,
rather than other aspects of US industrial policy. A number of factors
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made Exim a particularly attractive target. The Bank had historically
been subject to scrutiny from free market conservatives seeking to
reduce the scope of government. It was on the radar of many in
Washington, with higher visibility than many smaller and more
obscure industrial policy programs. Exim is a standalone government
corporation, with its own independent authorization process, in con-
trast to many industrial policy programs that are subsumed within
other federal agencies. It even has its own large building, occupying
an entire city block with its name prominently displayed in front,
located just a block from the White House. Exim is thus one of the
least ‘hidden’ parts of the ‘hidden developmental state’, rendering it
more vulnerable to attacks from free market conservatives. Exim is
considerably larger than other industrial policy programs: when shut-
down, Exim was providing over $20bn in financing annually, dwarf-
ing the budgets of programs like the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) ($3bn) or the Small Business Innovation
Research (SBIR) program ($2.5bn). And many of these other US indus-
trial policy programs have a security rationale, making them politi-
cally more difficult to target (Weiss 2014).
Furthermore, Exim made a compelling target because its financing
benefits some of the largest companies in the US, in contrast to many
industrial policy programs that target start-ups, small businesses or uni-
versity-based research: the fact that the Bank supports ‘big business’
made it easier to frame as a particularly egregious instance of ‘corporate
welfare’. Targeting Exim was similarly attractive because it finances
exports, unlike many US industrial policy programs that are geared
towards technological innovation and R&D. The types of arguments thus
available to the Tea Party in attacking Exim – that it was a wasteful mis-
use of taxpayer funds benefitting large corporations and their foreign
customers – resonated strongly with the American public. And as a
‘sunset’ agency, all that was needed to shutdown the Bank was to block
its reauthorization.
Moreover, for the Tea Party, its campaign against Exim is only the
start. To quote one representative, ‘When we looked for what kinds of
elephants we wanted to hunt, Exim was one of them. But Exim was never
the beginning and end for us – it’s proof of concept’.25 The Tea Party has
indicated that it intends to target other federal agencies that play a simi-
lar role in supporting American businesses and exports. Among their
next targets include the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC), which supplies funding for overseas infrastructure projects; the
Small Business Administration, which provides lending for small busi-
nesses; and federal subsidies and other forms of support for renewable
energy. As the Cato Institute (2015b) put it, ‘Hundreds more special inter-
est subsidies to go’. In effect, within its broader platform of reducing
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taxes and government regulation, a key objective of the Tea Party is to
identify, target, and eliminate other areas of the US’s ‘hidden’ develop-
mental state.
IMPLICATIONS FOR US ADVANCED MANUFACTURING
The Tea Party’s continuing offensive against the Export–Import Bank has
potentially significant implications for the US’s position in the global
economy. US spending on export credit is already dwarfed by China and
eliminating Exim would make the US the only major economy in the
world without an ECA. Eliminating Exim, or constraining its room to
maneuver, threatens to seriously impede the ability of US firms to com-
pete in key sectors. While the Bank only supports a relatively small per-
centage of US exports (about 2%), its financing is concentrated in capital
equipment and services (so-called ‘big-ticket’ exports): aircraft, satellites,
transportation equipment, large agricultural equipment, product-
manufacturing machinery, oil and gas, mining, power plants, and major
infrastructure projects. In these sectors, exports represent a significant
proportion of output, and Exim supports a far larger proportion of
exports. These capital goods sectors – technology-intensive and high-
value-added – are a cornerstone of the advanced manufacturing activity
that remains in the US, along with associated engineering, R&D and
other high-value services. These are also precisely the sectors that China
is moving into as it seeks to develop more advanced industries and foster
the global expansion of its firms (Kennedy 2015). More than half of
Exim’s financing, for example, goes to infrastructure projects, primarily
in emerging economies, an area where China is an increasingly promi-
nent global player. China’s goal is to become a major competitor to the
US and other rich countries in advanced manufacturing within the next
decade, and its strategy of using export credit to foster industrial devel-
opment is proving remarkably successful: as one official stated, ‘in
almost every capital goods sector, China is going from a bit player to
being one of the biggest’.26
The Tea Party is heavily critical of the fact that Exim supports ‘big busi-
ness’. But many of the large companies Exim supports (such as Boeing,
General Electric, and Caterpillar) are among the US’s largest exporters.
Companies such as these sit at the top of large supply chains, purchasing
inputs from a vast web of suppliers, with upstream and downstream
linkages that are vital to the overall strength of the US economy. While
Boeing, for example, directly provides 152,000 jobs in the US, it also sup-
ports a supply chain of over 14,000 other US companies employing
1.5 million people.27 It is precisely these chains of advanced, high value-
added manufacturing that have enabled the US to maintain its status as
the world’s second largest manufacturer, despite losing ground to China
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and other competitors (Nolan 2012). The Tea Party contends that compa-
nies should seek private financing, rather than relying on a government
agency; however, private financing is more costly than the lower rates
offered by ECAs and in emerging markets bidders are often required to
supply ECA financing. Consequently, eliminating Exim financing
increases the incentive for many of the largest US firms to shift their
sourcing and production to foreign countries where they can secure ECA
support, with consequent losses to the US manufacturing base and
employment.
State-backed export credit is particularly important in facilitating sales
to emerging markets, where less-developed banking and capital markets
limit the availability of private financing. Emerging markets now account
for the majority of global economic growth, and China, in particular, is
making aggressive use of export credit in these markets as a platform to
expand its global presence and market share (Br€autigam 2009). A director
of Acrow Corporation, an engineering company that makes prefabricated
bridges exported to emerging economies, where customers cannot read-
ily access private financing for large infrastructure projects without ECA
backing and its European and Chinese competitors are supported by
their own ECAs, described eliminating Exim as follows: ‘For us to pull
another arrow out of our quiver, it’s irrational, it’s terrifying and it’s
inappropriate when one considers the reality of the global marketplace’
(Weisman 2015).
In certain sectors, it is impossible to export without the backing of an
ECA. This is the case, for example, in the market for building and operat-
ing nuclear power plants. As an industry representative explained,
We simply cannot make a bid without ECA backing. It is often a
tender requirement. That doesn’t mean you are automatically
kicked out of a tender competition for non-compliance, but they
could. And, if it’s a nuclear reactor, you will be kicked out, because
you will never find a commercial bank that will finance building a
nuclear plant for 18 years.28
Due to their capital reserve requirements, commercial banks simply will
not extend multi-billion dollar loans for such long periods: ‘Exim will do
18 years. Commercial banks can’t even come close’. The result, he contin-
ued, is ‘for our industry, there’s no question about it: if we lose Exim,
we’re out of it. Exim keeps us in the game. We can compete based on our
other advantages, but not without this’. For such companies, in the
absence of Exim financing, their only option is to relocate production
abroad to gain access to foreign ECA support. According to one industry
representative,
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Amultinational like Westinghouse or GE will look out for itself and
continue to compete. If it can’t get ECA support here, it will source
the content from somewhere else. So we’ll see a shifting of content
out of the US. Westinghouse might continue to win tender but with-
out US content and US jobs.29
With rapidly growing demand for energy in emerging economies, the
market for nuclear equipment and services will potentially reach $750
billion over the next decade (CSIS 2013). While the US was once the dom-
inant supplier of commercial nuclear energy technology, its market share
is shrinking. Russia is now the world’s largest supplier and has made fur-
ther expanding its exports a strategic priority. Beyond its economic impli-
cations, Russia’s growing dominance in this market is identified as a
significant security risk (CSIS 2013). After Russia, China now has the
world’s second largest nuclear energy industry, and as a key target of its
industrial upgrading and ‘go global’ strategy, it is beginning a push to
export its nuclear energy technology. As a US industry representative
stated, soon ‘China will be a formidable competitor. They’re not there
yet, but they’ll get there. By 2030, they will be the biggest nuclear energy
power’. Without export credit support, the US is locking itself out of the
global market and ceding the field to its competitors.
Exim plays a similarly important role in supporting the US aerospace
sector. Boeing is the US’s largest exporter and the largest recipient of
Exim financing, with the Bank typically supporting about 10%–15% of
Boeing’s aircraft sales. As of 2014, Exim was supplying $32 billion in
financing to support the export of Boeing’s wide-body jets to buyers in 34
different countries (GAO 2014). Not only does Boeing face intense com-
petition from its European rival Airbus, as well as from Canada’s Bom-
bardier and Brazil’s Embraer as they move into producing larger aircraft
– all of which receive substantial ECA support – but China is also aggres-
sively seeking to penetrate this sector. Aerospace is a priority area of
China’s industrial upgrading plans. Its aviation companies enjoy sub-
stantial state credit support from China’s ECAs, and similar support was
an essential factor in the emergence of Airbus as Boeing’s main rival.
China has already developed its first regional and single-aisle jets and is
working towards the development of a wide-body aircraft. Although
China’s technology is currently less advanced, it is improving rapidly.
The state intends to fuel the expansion and upgrading of the Chinese
aerospace industry first through sales to the domestic market – which is
growing at extraordinary rates, with Chinese airlines expected to pur-
chase 6000 aircraft worth nearly $900 billion over the next 20 years
(Mitchell 2014) – followed by other emerging economies, and ultimately
more mature markets. By eliminating its use of export credit, the US is
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thus relinquishing an important tool for maintaining its competitive posi-
tion in the aircraft sector.
The disruption of export credit has already caused the US to lose
exports and employment, with foreign buyers turning to other suppliers
that can offer ECA financing. For example, prior to its shutdown, Exim
was supporting about 60% of sales by US satellite companies. Given the
high cost of satellites, export credit financing is a key factor in choosing
between US and other suppliers and often even a pass-or-fail criteria for
satellite deals. Without access to Exim financing, US firms lost three pre-
existing satellite orders to competitors in Canada and France able to pro-
vide ECA financing, causing the loss of hundreds of US jobs, and they
are locked out of competitions for new contracts where ECA support is
an explicit bidding requirement (Calmes 2015). Power projects are
another sector that is heavily reliant on ECA support. Without access to
government-backed export credit, Westinghouse is threatened with los-
ing a $20 billion deal to build nuclear reactors in India (Inside U.S. Trade
2016). Smaller firms are equally affected. As a result of the Exim shut-
down, a green energy company, FirmGreen, for example, lost a
$57 million contract for a Waste-to-Energy project in the Philippines to a
Korean competitor, and due to continued restrictions on Exim lending,
risks losing over $250 million in projects in Brazil.30 Combustion Associ-
ates, which makes energy-efficient power stations, is in danger of losing
sales totaling nearly $150 million in Nigeria to ECA-backed competitors
in Europe, China and Korea (CNBC 2015).
American multinationals are already relocating production to coun-
tries where they can secure ECA support. General Electric, for example,
one of the largest users of Exim financing, was bidding on over $11 bil-
lion worth of projects requiring ECA support when the Bank was shut-
down. These are projects, primarily in emerging markets, where bids
will not be considered without the backing of an ECA. GE is therefore
striking agreements with foreign ECAs willing to finance its exports and
shifting manufacturing from the US to those countries. This has included
moving: production of underwater oil and gas equipment to Britain,
along with 1000 jobs; production of gas-powered engines and 350 jobs to
Canada; aircraft engine production to Canada; turboprop aircraft engine
manufacturing and 1000 jobs to the Czech Republic; and 500 jobs produc-
ing generators and aeroderivative turbines to France, Hungary and
China (Calmes 2016). GE’s motives are simple: ‘We’re doing this because
if we don’t, we can’t submit a valid tender’ (Lawder 2015). For their part,
countries on the receiving end of this investment freely acknowledge that
they are benefiting from the disruption of the US Export–Import Bank: as
one official stated, ‘frankly, it’s been great for us’.31 Constraints on export
credit are thus contributing to diminishing the industrial base in the US
while strengthening that of its rivals.
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While large multinationals are able to change their production strate-
gies and relocate manufacturing production overseas in order to access
ECA support, smaller US firms – and, of course, US workers – simply do
not have that option. By limiting export credit, the US is directly under-
mining its own exports and jobs, at a time when they are already under
threat from emerging competitors (Chin and Gallagher 2015). As one US
industry representative stated, ‘Eliminating Exim will do in the last part
of the US manufacturing sector, increasingly hollowing out the US export
base. The consequences may take many years to appear, but that’s what’s
coming’.32
The immediate effects of the Exim shutdown and prolonged restric-
tions on its lending have been moderated somewhat by favorable finan-
cial conditions – high global liquidity and low interest rates – which have
made it easier for US companies to access alternative sources of financ-
ing. However, amid tighter financial conditions, the absence of Exim
financing will have far more severe implications for US firms. Further-
more, on a systemic level, state-backed export credit performs a vital
counter-cyclical function, helping to buffer trade from disruptions in
financial markets and minimize the effects of credit contractions on the
real economy. During the global financial crisis, the volume of Exim lend-
ing quadrupled, as the Bank stepped in to offset the gap in commercial
credit and prevent a more devastating plunge in US exports; at the height
of the crisis, for example, the US’s largest exporter, Boeing, relied on
Exim for nearly 40% of its exports. Without a functional ECA, the US is
both relinquishing an important industrial policy tool and undermining
its ability to respond to future financial crises.
Confronted with the suggestion that eliminating Exim would damage
US competitiveness, given that its rivals are providing substantial
amounts of export credit to their firms, Tea Party opponents are quick to
dismiss such concerns. The following response, provided by the Club for
Growth, is typical: ‘So what? If other nations engage in corporate welfare,
that is no reason for the US to follow suit in the name of a level playing
field. We don’t need to import other nations’ bad policies’.33 The Tea
Party maintains that China only hurts its own economy by providing
state-backed financing for its exports – based on the assumption that any
state intervention inevitably creates inefficiencies that impede economic
growth.34 The Tea Party further claims that if the US stopped its use of
export credit, its resulting success would have a ‘demonstration effect’,
encouraging others to do the same.35
The Tea Party contends that eliminating Exim would enable the US to
‘lead by example’ in efforts to eliminate government-backed ECA pro-
grams internationally, and that the US can use the existing system of
global trade rules and disciplines – which it played a leading role in cre-
ating and long dominated – to force other countries to cede their own use
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of export credit. In reality, however, the US has been trying for years to
bring China and other emerging economies under international disci-
plines but such efforts have been unsuccessful. State-backed export credit
is governed by the OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported Export
Credits, which was initiated by the US in the 1970s as a means to limit
the ability of states to use export credit to subsidize their exports; how-
ever, since China and the emerging economies are not members of the
OECD, their use of export credit is not constrained by these rules. The
BRICs have refused to join the OECD Arrangement, and US-led efforts to
negotiate a new set of rules that would encompass the BRICs have made
no progress.36
Given the centrality of export credit to their development strategies,
the emerging economies have little incentive either to join existing gover-
nance arrangements or subject themselves to new disciplines that could
inhibit their future growth prospects. A representative of the US Cham-
ber of Commerce expressed it thus: ‘Their economies depend on their
ECAs. I don’t see a world where they’re suddenly going to say “OK, we
don’t need our ECAs”. That’s just not realistic’.37 The same is true of the
US’s other competitors – in the words of one US industry representative,
‘The notion that if we unilaterally disarm, we’d be better off is ridiculous.
We’re shooting ourselves in the foot right now. None of our trade com-
petitors are going to pull back. They’re doubling down on support, while
we’re sitting here debating whether Exim should exist’.38 Furthermore,
while opponents of Exim contend that the US could challenge China and
its other competitors’ use of export credit via the WTO (see, for example,
Cato Institute 2015a; Heritage Foundation 2014), WTO officials indicate
that, due to the nature of WTO dispute settlement, this would be
‘extraordinarily difficult if not impossible’.39 The Tea Party’s assertion
that the US can simply convince or compel other states to restrain their
use of export credit thus reflects an unduly optimistic view of the US’s
current power in the global political economy and its ability to shape the
behavior of other states.
CONCLUSION
At a time when many states – both developed and developing – are
increasingly turning away from the neoliberal orthodoxy, in the US, in
contrast, the Tea Party’s campaign against the Export–Import Bank sug-
gests that market fundamentalism is becoming even more deeply
entrenched and politically powerful. As this analysis has shown, while
its competitors are increasing their use of export credit amid a wider
embrace of industrial policy, the US is a conspicuous outlier. Due to the
rising power of the Tea Party and other conservative groups, the ability
of the US to use export credit to support its firms and exporters has been
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severely disrupted. By circumscribing, and potentially even eliminating
its Export–Import Bank, the US is undermining the competitiveness of
important industrial sectors and contributing to the movement of
advanced, high-value manufacturing abroad. The case of export credit
thus illustrates how domestic political forces – specifically the rise of a
powerful anti-state movement – may be hindering the ability of the US to
conduct effective industrial policy, respond to emerging challengers, and
maintain its economic primacy in the face of growing global competitive
pressures. The rise of an ultra-free-market ideological movement is
undermining core aspects of the US’s own developmental state and
shackling the US’s capacity to compete effectively with competitors that
are active and highly effective users of industrial policy.
Surprisingly, in the face of the Tea Party and the sway of its market
fundamentalist ideology, big business has found its power severely ham-
pered. The irony is that major American business actors were originally
the leading champions of neoliberalism and key drivers of its ascendance
in the US and globally (Blyth 2002). Much of the pro-market agenda
embraced by the Tea Party – deregulation, promoting flexible labor mar-
kets, reducing taxes, trade liberalization, etc. – was initiated by business
as a means to enhance its profitability. Business played a central role in
the production and dissemination of free market ideas and, through its
considerable political influence, helped to engineer a sea change in ideol-
ogy and public policy. Yet analysis of the contemporary politics of export
credit shows that market fundamentalism – long seen as a pro-business
movement (Blyth 2002) – is now actually being used against business
and undermining its material interests.
This case departs from traditional theories of state behavior in interna-
tional political economy, whether realist assumptions that states will act to
increase their economic and military power, Marxist conceptions of the
state as the ‘executive committee of the bourgeoisie’, or constructivist
accounts that emphasize the role of rational, expert-based ideas and dis-
courses.40 Instead, the disruption of US export credit illuminates the power
of a non-rational political ideology to move the behavior of a powerful state
– against its national interests as well as the interests of its business elites.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This research was supported by an Economic and Social Research Coun-
cil (ESRC) Future Research Leaders grant (ES/N017390/1).
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
25
HOPEWELL: MARKET FUNDAMENTALISM VS. INDUSTRIAL POLICY
FUNDING
Economic and Social Research Council [grant number ES/N017390/1].
NOTES
1. The analysis draws on field research conducted between 2015 and 2016, pri-
marily in Washington, as well as in Paris and Geneva, involving over 35
interviews with representatives of the leading actors in the pro- and anti-
Exim campaigns (including Tea Party organizations, business associations,
and NGOs); US government officials and negotiators; and OECD, WTO and
foreign officials.
2. Interview, July 2016.
3. Annual Report, 2014.
4. Exim Report to Congress on Global Export Credit Competition, 2015.
5. Exim Report to Congress on Global Export Credit Competition, 2015.
6. Interview, July 2015.
7. Interview, July 2015.
8. In the 1980s, when highly subsidized lending led to rising costs, amid record
fiscal deficits and the Reagan administration’s push to reduce the size of the
federal government, the Bank came under pressure to reduce its budget. But,
even then, the Bank’s congressional champions ultimately succeeded in
strengthening and expanding its mandate.
9. Letter from Representative Hensarling to Republican members of Congress,
February 2015.
10. Interview, July 2015.
11. Interview, July 2015.
12. Interviews, July 2015.
13. Interview, July 2015.
14. Interview, July 2015.
15. Interview, July 2015.
16. Exim Competitiveness Report, 2015.
17. Interview, July 2015.
18. Interview, July 2015.
19. Interview, July 2015.
20. Interview, July 2015.
21. Interview, July 2015.
22. Interview, July 2015.
23. Interview, July 2015.
24. Interview, July 2015.
25. Interview, July 2015.
26. Interview, July 2016.
27. Company data.
28. Interview, July 2015.
29. Interview, July 2015.
30. Testimony of FirmGreen CEO, House Financial Services Committee, 2014.
Santa Clarita Valley Signal, ‘Politics as Usual Putting Local Businesses and
Jobs at Risk’, 7 July 2016.
31. Interview, November 2016.
32. Interview, July 2015.
33. Blog Post, 17 June 2015.
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34. Interview, July 2015.
35. Interview, July 2015.
36. Brazil’s participation in the Aircraft Sector Understanding is an exception.
37. Interview, July 2015.
38. Interview, July 2015.
39. Interviews, July 2016.
40. I thank an anonymous reviewer for this point.
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